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ABSTRACT
Placeshifting is a convenient service that enables
customers to enjoy television programs from their home
countries even if they are in foreign countries.
Placeshifting works by receiving/recording a television
program in one country and then transmitting the digital
data to customers everywhere in the world via the Internet
upon each customer’s request. Because placeshifting may
be involved with recording and/or transmitting copyrighted
content, service providers must face the question whether
they may be liable for copyright infringement. In the United
States, the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network v. CSC
Holdings decided the legality of placeshifting by requiring
a “volition element” for direct infringement. In Japan,
however, court decisions have varied. Most of the courts
have applied an overall consideration standard such as the
“Karaoke rule.” As a result, there remains large
uncertainty about the state of the law in Japan. This Article
introduces the legal basis and judicial decisions for
∗
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placeshifting both in the United States and Japan and
suggests introducing the volition requirement as one
possible solution for the uncertainty in Japan.
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INTRODUCTION
If you go abroad for business or to study for a long period,
wouldn’t it be convenient to be able to watch your favorite
television programs from home? Recently, a so-called
“placeshifting” 1 service has come to fulfill such a demand. With
placeshifting, customers can watch television programs, including
copyrighted ones, through a device installed by the service
provider, who then must face the question whether the service
provider may be liable for copyright infringement.
The U.S. copyright statute does not answer this question
directly because such a service did not exist at the time the
legislation was drafted, and there has been no case law directly
addressing this issue. In the digitalization and networking era, as
the Supreme Court indicated in MGM Studios v. Grokster, 2 it is
essential to consider not only “copyright protection” but also
“promoting innovation in new communication technologies.” 3 In
1

See Digital Content and Enabling Technology: Satisfying the 21st Century
Consumer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 15 (2006)
(statement of Mr. Jason Krikorian, one of the founders of Sling Media Inc.,
about the term “placeshifting.”). At a hearing of Congress, Mr. Krikorian
introduced his product, SlingBox, by saying:
[W]hat we believe is this notion of placeshifting is the next
major evolution in television viewing. And what does it do? It
greatly increases the number of displays, that I can watch my
familiar television, which is the key word here, but also
greatly increases the number of places that I can watch my
familiar television as well. . . . So quite simply, the Slingbox,
which is this small box that you can buy now at Best Buy,
CompUSA, over 3,000 stores nationwide, is $200, $249 retail.
Basically take your television signal, put this in your home,
take your basic cable, take your TiVo, take your satellite box,
really over 5,000 different devices, plug your TV signal in,
connect it to your home network, and then wherever you
happen to be, you can watch and control your living room TV
just like you were sitting on the couch.
Id. at 16.
2
MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
3
Id. at 928. Also in the Japanese Copyright Act, its purpose is not limited
only to the protection of an author’s benefit. Namely, the Japanese Copyright
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deciding the legality of the placeshifting service, therefore, courts
must balance these factors. 4 Without a proper balance, any
company that wants to introduce new technology services may be
too cautious to start its business.
In Japan, conclusions on this issue have varied among court
decisions. Thus, there is uncertainty for any company that plans to
introduce a placeshifting service to predict whether its business
will be legal. In the United States, however, the Second Circuit
rendered a decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings 5
(Cablevision) that lends some guidance. The most remarkable
point in this decision is that the court required a “volition” 6
element for the existence of direct infringement. The court held
that the placeshifting provider was not liable for direct
infringement on the ground that any “volitional” conduct
associated with copying the copyrighted content at issue was not
made by the provider but by individual customers instead. 7 This
Article analyzes the current legal problems for placeshifting, both
in the United States and Japan.
Chapter I provides a general overview of placeshifting
services, both in the U.S. and in Japan. Chapter II introduces, as
Act defines its purposes as not only “to secure the protection of the rights of
authors, etc.,” but also to obtain “a just and fair exploitation of. . . cultural
products,” and consequently “to contribute to the development of culture.”
Chosakuken Hō [Japanese Copyright Act], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 1,
translated in CHOSAKUKEN KANKEI HŌREI DĒTA BĒSU [COPYRIGHT-RELATED
LAW DATABASE] (Copyright Research and Information Center (CRIC)),
available at http://www.cric.or.jp/cric_e/clj/clj.html.
4
See Dominic H. Rivers, Note, Paying for Cable in Boston, Watching It on
a Laptop in L.A.: Does Slingbox Violate Federal Copyright Laws?, 41 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 159, 192 (2007).
5
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (hereinafter Cablevision).
6
Generally, the term “volition” means “the power to choose something
freely or to make your own decision.” OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S
DICTIONARY of CURRENT ENGLISH 1391 (7th ed. 2005). The substantial
meaning of the term “volition” as used in Cablevision will be introduced later.
7
See Chad Woodford & Mitchell Zimmerman, Second Circuit Paints
Digital Cloudscape Favoring Technology Firms’ Use of Copyrighted Content,
25.12 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 5, 5 (2008); see also Cablevision, 536 F.3d
at 130-133.
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the basis of comparative law, the basic structures of the U.S. and
Japanese copyright laws regarding the liability of an indirect actor.
Chapter III discusses the volition requirement in Cablevision.
Chapter IV discusses Japanese case law regarding placeshifting
services and shows the problems caused by uncertainty. Chapter V
analyzes how Japanese law should treat the legality of
placeshifting.
I. WHAT IS “PLACESHIFTING”?
A. Characteristics of Placeshifting Service
Placeshifting is a service whereby: (1) a device set by the
provider receives and records 8 television programs broadcast in
one country and (2) transmits the programs to its customers via the
Internet, so that (3) its customers can then view the programs
anywhere in the world. It must also be recognized that most of the
services use a device that is individually allocated to each customer
at the provider’s central place of business and is manipulated via
remote control by each customer, not by the service provider. It is
not a mere rebroadcasting of the TV broadcast, 9 but is similar to
the use of a DVD recorder or a video cassette recorder (VCR).
Sling Media Inc., one such placeshifting provider, defines the
term “placeshifting” as:
[A] service that “allows anyone with a broadband
Internet connection to have video streams from their
home television set, DVR or other video source
(such as a DVD player or home security camera)
8

Some placeshifting services do not have a function for recording television
programs by its central device, but merely transmit it to the customer such as
Maneki TV in Japan.
9
In Japan, rebroadcasting constitutes infringement of the neighboring right
of broadcasting organizations. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 99(1).
Also, rebroadcasting might be infringement of copyright (right of public
transmission). Id. at art. 23(1). Similarly, rebroadcasting might constitute
infringement of the public performance right in the U.S. 17 U.S.C. §106(4),
§101(“To perform . . . a work ‘publicly’ means . . . (2) to transmit or otherwise
communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public . . . “).
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forwarded for viewing remotely on a computer,
netbook, or mobile phone at any location where
they have a high-speed Internet connection or
cellular data network.10
Accordingly, placeshifting can best be understood in
relationship to its predecessor, “timeshifting.” Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios 11 centered on whether the
defendant, Sony, was liable for contributory infringement by
making and selling Betamax video tape recorders. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the “timeshifting” function of Betamax was
a permissible “substantial noninfringing use. 12 The Court
explained timeshifting as follows:
[T]he practice of recording a program to view it
once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it. Timeshifting enables viewers to see programs they
otherwise would miss because they are not at home,
are occupied with other tasks, or are viewing a
program on another station at the time of a
broadcast that they desire to watch. 13
However, it can be said that placeshifting is well beyond such a
timeshifting function 14 because the user can view the program
anywhere in the world as long as she is connected through the
Internet. Namely, the user may select the place to view TV
programs. That is why it is known as “placeshifting.”
Although placeshifting is a successor to timeshifting, it is not a
completely novel technology. Placeshifting combines some
preexisting technologies such as digital recording technology and
networking technology. 15 The innovative point in placeshifting is
10

Sling Media, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/placeshifting (last visited
May 26, 2011).
11
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
12
Id. at 442.
13
Id. at 423.
14
See Sling Media, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/placeshifting (last
visited May 26, 2011).
15
See Rivers, supra note 4, at 159. In this regard, the Second Circuit in
Cablevision explained that the device at issue, the Remote Storage Digital Video
Recorder System, “use[s] a technology akin to both traditional, set-top digital
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its combination of these pre-existing technologies with new
services designed to match consumers’ demands.
B. Placeshifting Service Providers in the U.S. And Japan
In the United States, placeshifting service providers include
Cablevision (Service: “RS-DVR”), 16 Sling Media (Product:
“Slingbox”), 17 SageTV, LLC (Product: “SageTV Placeshifter”), 18
Orb Networks (Service: “MyCasting”), 19 and Sony (Product:
“LocationFree”). 20 Similarly, in Japan there have been several
placeshifting services such as “Maneki TV” by Nagano Syōten
K.K., 21 “Rokuraku II” by Nihon Digital Kaden K.K., 22 “Rokuga
Net” by FA Vision K.K. 23 and “Yoridorimidori” by Kuromusaizu
K.K. 24 Any one of these companies risks being sued by content
owners in the future due to the unpredictability of copyright
liability. 25
C. Differentiation from the Term “Space-Shifting”
In Japan, some Japanese articles use the term “space-shifting”
broadly, instead of “placeshifting,” to include transmitting services
video recorders, like TiVo (“DVRs”), and the video-on-demand (“VOD”)
services.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123.
16
Optimum, http://optimum.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1762/
related/1 (last visited May 26, 2011).
17
Slingbox® SOLO, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/solo and Slingbox®
PRO-HD, http://www.slingmedia.com/go/prohd (last visited May 26, 2011).
18
Sage TV, http://sagetv.com/placeshifter.html (last visited May 26, 2011).
19
Orb, http://www.orb.com/en (last visited May 26, 2011).
20
Sony, LocationFree Bast Station, http://www.sonystyle.com (last visited
May 26, 2011).
21
Manekitv, http://www.manekitv.com (last visited May 26, 2011).
22
Rokuraku, http://www.rokuraku.com (last visited May 26, 2011).
23
http://www.6ga.net (last visited May 26, 2011). However, FA Vision
stopped Rokuga Net in 2006 in accordance with the settlement with copyright
holders after the Intellectual Property High Court’s decision that the service
constitutes copyright infringement on November 15, 2005.
24
Author unable to locate Yoridorimidori website after the Osaka High
Court granted injunction against it on June 14, 2007.
25
See Rivers, supra note 4, at 179.

156

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:2

for television programs such as Maneki TV or Rokuraku II. 26 In
the United States, providers of Internet-related services, such as
file-sharing services, originally used the term “space-shifting” to
emphasize their service’s legality as “fair use” by drawing a
comparison to “time-shifting,” 27 which was held to be legal in
Sony. 28 These service providers argued under the term “spaceshifting” that, “[A] person who owns a copyrighted compact disc
who then copies the content to a digital file does not engage in
infringement. Instead, that person is merely shifting material that
she already owns from one ‘space’ to another.”29 However, such a
fair use defense was later denied by the courts.30 Accordingly, this
Article distinguishes the term “placeshifting” from the term
“space-shifting” and uses the former for the services at issues in
the Cablevision 31 case in the United States and some cases in
Japan.

26

See, e.g., Hisao Shiomi, Chosakuken Shingai no Sekinin Syutai –
Fuhoukouihou oyobi Shiteki Fukusei/ Koushū Sōshin Ken no Shiten kara –
[Responsible Principal of Copyright Infringement – From Perspective of Tort
Law and Private Reproduction and Right of Public Transmission], in SAITŌ
HIROSHI SENSEI GOTAISYOKU KINEN RONSHŪ - GENDAI SYAKAI TO CHOSAKUKEN HŌ [THE
PRESENT SOCIETY AND COPYRIGHT LAW - ANNIVERSARY COLLECTION OF ARTICLES FOR
RETIREMENT OF PROFESSOR HIROSHI SAITŌ] 197, 214-215 (Toyohiro Nomura &
Toshiaki Makino ed., 2008).
27
See Rivers, supra note 4, at 175-76; see also A&M Records v. Napster,
239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (using the term “space-shifting”), UMG
Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (using the
term “space shift” in the context of fair use defense).
28
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55 (affirming the district court’s conclusion that
“home time-shifting is fair use.”).
29
Rivers, supra note 4, at 175-76 (emphasis added).
30
Id. at 176; see also Napster. 239 F.3d at 1019; MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d
at 351.
31
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
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II. U.S. AND JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW REGARDING
INDIRECT LIABILITY
A. U.S. Copyright Law
There are two legal theories to hold liable a service provider
who causes exploitation of copyrighted works by its customers:
direct infringement and secondary liability.
1. Direct infringement in the digital and networking era
Direct infringement can be established by showing that a
defendant directly infringes exclusive rights listed in Section 106
of the Copyright Act, such as the reproduction right 32 or the public
performance right. 33 Because current services in the digital and
networking era did not exist at the time the Copyright Act of 1976
was drafted, it is difficult to determine the scope of the exclusive
rights applied to such services.
Further, courts might have difficulty trying to decide who
actually exploits a particular copyrighted work, and thus who
directly infringes a particular exclusive right—the service provider
or its end users. Professor Ginsburg has indicated:
[T]he exclusive rights are capacious, but new
technologies may have caused some of the general
phrases to become more constraining than might
have been expected from a text whose drafters took
pains to make forward looking. . . . Entrepreneurs
and users of new technological means of exploiting
copyrighted works have urged narrow constructions
of each of these terms, arguing that broad
interpretations will chill future innovation (and
suppress present markets for copyright-exploiting
32

17 U.S.C. §106(1) (identifying “the exclusive right[] . . . to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords”).
33
17 U.S.C. §106(4) (identifying “the exclusive right[] . . . in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly”).
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devices or services). Copyright owners, concerned
that unfettered new uses will supplant traditional
copyright-controlled markets, have contended that
the literal language, or, failing that, congressional
intent, encompass the contested use. In addition,
new technologies have called into question the
identification of the person who “does” the
copyright-implicating acts. 34
The legality of placeshifting is directly related to this question.
a. Netcom decision
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communications Services is one example of a direct infringement
case in the digital and networking era. 35 In Netcom, the court
addressed whether an Internet service provider (ISP) is liable for
direct infringement by automatically copying user-posted content
in the random access memory (RAM) of its central computer. 36 An
Internet user could post a copyrighted work without any consent of
its copyright holder on a certain bulletin board system (BBS)
through Netcom facilities. During that process, the posted content
was automatically copied in the RAM of Netcom’s central
computer. The plaintiff, a copyright content owner, sued Netcom,
in addition to the Internet user and the BBS operator, for direct
infringement of the reproduction right and for secondary liability.
The District Court for the Northern District of California
concluded that Netcom was not liable for direct infringement, 37
reasoning that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute,
there should still be some element of volition or causation which is
lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy
34

Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law – Part II,
Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb?, in Columbia Public Law & Legal
Theory Working Papers, Paper 08158, 1(2008), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/08158 (emphasis added).
35
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
36
See id. at 1367-73.
37
Id. at 1372-73.
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by a third party.” 38 In other words, Netcom required a volition
element for direct infringement.
Under this requirement, a service provider should not be liable
for direct infringement unless it engages in some volitional
conduct in relationship to the copying of a particular copyrighted
work. For example, if a BBS operator censors a specific posted
content and then later decides to display it on the bulletin board,
the volition requirement might be satisfied. However, Netcom—an
ISP—neither censored any posted content nor decided whether a
specific content may be displayed or not. Consequently, the court
was not persuaded that Netcom committed such volitional conduct
concerning the plaintiff’s specific copyrighted work at issue posted
by the Internet user. 39
The volition standard in Netcom has been adopted by
subsequent courts. 40 Netcom also influenced the safe harbor
provisions in the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act, an integral component of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). By including the language “automatic
technical process” 41 in the statute, Congress essentially codified
Netcom as a safe harbor for “transitory digital network
38

Id. at 1370.
See id. at 1372.
40
See, e.g., CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 550-55 (4th Cir. 2004)
(ISP case denying direct infringement); Arista Records v. USENET.com, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124, 147-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (BBS operator case denying direct
infringement); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006),
aff’d mem., 242 Fed. Appx. 833 (3rd Cir. 2007) (holding cashing websites by
Googlebot not direct infringement); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106
(D. Nev. 2006) (holding cashing websites by Googlebot not direct
infringement); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (BBS operator case denying direct infringement). But see Playboy Enters.
v. Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1175 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (denying the
application of the volition requirement by distinguishing the present case
concerning the contents website operator from the ISP case in Netcom).
41
17 U.S.C. §512(a)(2) (“[T]he transmission, routing, provision of
connections, or storage is carried out through an automatic technical process
without selection of the material by the service provider.”) (emphasis added); 17
U.S.C. §512(b)(1)(C) (“[T]he storage is carried out through an automatic
technical process for the purpose of making the material available to users of the
system or network who . . . request access to the material from the person . . .”)
(emphasis added).
39
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communications” (17 U.C.C. §512(a)) and “system caching” (17
U.C.C. §512(b)). 42
2. Secondary Liability
Although the U.S. Copyright Act does not have any statutory
provision for secondary liability, there are three categories of wellestablished secondary liability under case law: vicarious, 43
contributory, 44 and inducement liability. 45 Before analyzing
42

See 3-12B Nimmer on Copyright §12B.06 [B][2][a]-[b] (2010). Professor
Nimmer said, “to apply the law as it is actually written, courts at present must
advert to the Netcom factor of there being ‘some element of volition’ when it
comes to the safe harbors for transmitting [note: §512(a)] and caching [note:
§512(b)].” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][a]. Professor Nimmer also indicated, after
codifying the volition requirement in the safe harbor provisions, “Netcom’s
requirement for ‘some element of volition’ should not be viewed as a freestanding feature of copyright law. Rather, it should be followed to the extent that
Congress deliberately embodied it into the law, and not followed in the other
instances for which Congress chose not to codify it.” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][b].
In contrast, some lower courts have actually required the Netcom’s volition
element even after birth of the safe harbor provisions. Thus, it can be said that
there is still uncertainty on this issue regarding the relationship between the
volition requirement in Netcom and the safe harbor provisions. Just as with the
Cablevision case, placeshifting providers lost the occasion that the U.S.
Supreme Court would discuss this issue because it denied granting a writ of
certiorari. See infra Chapter III.D of this Article. Addressing such U.S. Supreme
court’s denial, Professor Nimmer finally said, “[t]he last word therefore has yet
to be pronounced here.” Id. at §12B.06 [B][2][b].
43
Vicarious liability exists if the following two requirements are satisfied:
(1) “the defendant must possess the right and ability to supervise the infringing
conduct” and (2) “the defendant must have an obvious and direct financial
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” Nimmer, supra note 42,
§12.04 [A][2] (citation omitted). See Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259
(9th Cir. 1996).
44
“[I]f there is knowledge that the work in question constitutes an
infringement, then one who causes another to infringe will himself be liable as
an infringer.” Nimmer, supra note 42, §12.04 at [A][3][a]. See Gershwin Publ’g
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
45
The Supreme Court in Grokster clarified the inducement rule, holding
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
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placeshifting, it is important to note two important issues related to
secondary liability: the staple article doctrine and the role of direct
infringement.
a. Sony’s staple-article rule for contributory liability
The Supreme Court in Sony ruled that copying equipment
should not constitute contributory infringement if it is capable of
“substantial noninfringing uses,” referring to the “staple article of
commerce” doctrine regulated in Section 271(c) 46 of the U.S.
Patent Act:
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike
a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate
demand for effective -- not merely symbolic -protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights
of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated
areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of
copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it
need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses. 47
46

Section 271(c) provides the contributory liability for patent infringement:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. §271(c) (emphasis added).
It expressly provides an exception for contributory liability that the sale of a
“staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use” is not contributory infringement. Thus, this exception is called the “staple
article of commerce doctrine.” See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
47
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. This rule was applied to the ISP case. See, e.g.,
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Necessity of direct infringement for secondary liability

In order to establish a secondary liability claim, there must be
direct infringement as a basis of the secondary liability. In this
regard, Professor Nimmer suggests:
[I]t is more in keeping with traditional notions of
third party liability to confine the inquiry into
whether there can be culpable participation in an
infringement to those instances when such
infringement has in fact occurred. The Supreme
Court [in Grokster] has recognized the validity of
this proposition in its explication of one branch of
third party liability, commenting that “the
inducement theory of course requires evidence of
actual infringement by recipients of the device.”. . .
[T]he rule should generally prevail that third party
liability, as its name implies, may exist only when
direct liability, i.e., infringement, is present. 48
Thus, in a case of placeshifting, a service provider should not
be secondarily liable for its customer’s exploitation of a particular
copyrighted work, provided that the customer is not liable for
direct infringement, perhaps because the customer can establish a
valid defense such as fair use. 49
3. Fair use exception
Even if someone exploits a copyrighted work without consent
by the copyright holder, he or she is not liable for copyright
infringement provided such exploitation constitutes “fair use.” 50 In
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373-75. Also, this rule was applied to the file-sharing
service cases. See, e.g., A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
48
Nimmer, supra note 42, §12.04 at [D][1] (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at
940).
49
See Woodford, supra note 7, at 10; see also Michael Bartley, Slinging
Television: A New Battleground For Technology And Content Holders?, 48
IDEA 535, 558-59 (2008).
50
17 U.S.C. §107.
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determining whether exploitation of copyrighted work is “fair
use,” Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act stipulates that the
following factors should be considered:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.51
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the home timeshifting use
by an individual user of Betamax constituted fair use 52 and that the
Betamax was capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.” 53
B. Japanese Copyright Law
Similar to the United States, an indirect actor who does not
directly exploit a particular copyrighted work, but is indirectly
involved with it, may be liable for copyright infringement in Japan.
However, in contrast with the United States, Japanese copyright
law does not have an independent rule for “secondary liability.” 54
51

Id.
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 454-55.
53
See id. at 455.
54
Japanese scholars discuss the indirect actor’s liability under an issue
named “Kansetsu Shingai” [indirect infringement] in comparison with the
general infringement issue. See, e.g., Yoshiyuki Tamura, Chosakuken no
Kansetsu Shingai [Indicrect Infringement of Copyright], 26 Chitekizaisan
Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 35 (2010), Hirotaka Fujiwara et al., Chosakuken no
Kansetsu Shingai no Hōri to Sono Genkai [The Rule of Indirect Infringement of
Copyright and its Limitation], in Chosakukenhō no Shin Ronten [New Issues of
Japanese Copyright Act] 393 (2008).
However, the term “Kansetsu Shingai” [indirect infringement] itself legally
have no meaning. Thus, in Japan, the literal differentiation between the terms
“direct infringement” and “indirect infringement” never provides any substantial
legal rule.
52
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Instead, Japanese court interprets liability through the lens of direct
infringement.
1. Copyright Holder’s Claims of Damage and Injunction Relief
In a copyright infringement case, a copyright holder may
seek both damages and injunctive relief. A damages claim is based
on tort law. 55 There is a general tort rule, Article 719(2) of the
Japanese Civil Code, that provides an indirect actor’s liability:
Article 719 [(1) If more than one person has
inflicted damages on others by their joint tortious
acts, each of them shall be jointly and severally
liable to compensate for those damages. . . .] (2)
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall
apply to any person who incited or was an
accessory to the perpetrator, by deeming him/her to
be one of the joint tort-feasors. 56
This provision has been applied to damages claims in copyright
infringement cases, but not to claims seeking injunctive relief.
Under tort law, a copyright holder can therefore benefit only from
monetary compensation, 57 not injunctive relief. 58
In contrast, in intellectual property infringement cases,
Japanese court may grant injunctive relief when explicit statutory
authorization allows it. 59 Explicit legislative authorization for
55

MINPŌ [JAPANESE CIVIL CODE], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated
in NIHON HŌREI GAIKOKUGOYAKU DĒTA BĒSU [JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION
(Ministry
of
Justice,
Japan)
available
at
DATABASE]
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1928&vm=04&re=01&
new=1 (emphasis added).
56
Id. art. 719 (emphasis added).
57
Id. art. 721 (1), 417, 723.
58
See Tamura, supra note 54, at 35-36, RYŪ T AKABAYASHI, HYŌJUN
TOKKYO HŌ [PATENT LAW FROM THE GROUND UP], 3-4 (3d ed. 2008).
59
See, e.g., Tokkyo Hō [Japanese Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art.
100, Syōhyō Hō [Japanese Trademark Act], Law No. 127 of 1959, art. 36, Isyō
Hō [Japanese Design Act], Law No. 125 of 1959, art. 37. Unlike U.S. courts that
authorize injunction as an equitable remedy, Japanese law in civil law country
does not recognize equity.
The reason why courts need statutory authorization is because the origin of
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copyright infringement, Article 112 of the Copyright Act provides:
Article 112. (1) Against those who infringe or are
likely to infringe the moral rights of authors,
copyright, right of publication, moral rights of
performers or neighboring rights, the author, the
performer or the owner of a copyright, right of
publication or neighboring rights may make a
demand for cessation or prevention of such
infringements. 60
According to the plain language of Article 112 (1), a copyright
holder who wants injunctive relief must prove that a defendant
falls within the scope of the principal committing infringement.
Because injunctive relief is an important tool for copyright
holders to stop infringing conduct, it is quite common in Japan that
a plaintiff will seek injunctive relief in a copyright infringement
lawsuit. As a result, in the case that an indirect actor’s liability is
contended, it is common to discuss whether the indirect actor falls
within the scope of the principal committing the infringement in
injunctive relief in intellectual property law (such as Japanese Patent Act,
Japanese Copyright Act) is derived from “Haitateki Shihai Ken” [exclusive
possession] inhered in “Yūtai Butsu” [tangible thing], a terminology of “Bukken
Hō” [real right law].
Professor Ryū Takabayashi indicated, under Japanese law:
[A]n object covered by Haitateki Shihai Ken is limited to
Yūtai Butsu (JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 85). . . . There cannot
exist the concept “Mutai Butsu” [intangible thing] under
JAPANESE CIVIL CODE. Furthermore, the Bukken [real right]
as the Haitateki Shihai Ken for Butsu [thing] must be created
by JAPANESE CIVIL CODE or other legislations (“Bukken
Houtei Syugi”) [Policy that real rights must be established by
legislation]; JAPANESE CIVIL CODE, art. 175). Thus, in order
to create a right having Haitateki Shihai Ken akin to the
Bukken and to grant Haitateki Shihai Ken for “Mutai no”
[intangible] information derived from human, each intellectual
property act such as Japanese Patent Act and Japanese
Copyright Act has been enacted as special act of JAPANESE
CIVIL CODE.
Takabayashi, supra note 58, at 3 (2005).
60
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 112. Similar provisions of
injunctive relief exist in other IP acts.
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order to obtain injunctive relief in addition to the damages
available under tort law.
2. Case Law Enlarging the Scope of a Principal Committing
Copyright Infringement
In cases in which an indirect actor’s liability for copyright
infringement is contended, courts in the past would flexibly
enlarge the scope of the principal committing such copyright
infringement. The origin of this practice is called the Karaoke rule,
which was originally adopted to decide whether a manager of a
traditional Japanese Karaoke bar 61 was liable for infringement of
the “right of performance” 62 on copyrighted musical works when it
provided occasions for its customers to perform such works. 63
Copyright holders wanted to charge the manager of such a
Karaoke bar instead of an individual customer. Thus, the
establishment of a copyright infringement claim against a Karaoke
bar manager was discussed. The Supreme Court in JASRAC
(Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and
Publishers) v. Ju San Fou (“Club Cat’s-eye”) 64 concluded that the
manager was a principal of performance on the ground that: (1) the
customers’ performance was made under the manager’s
management through inducement to sing by the employees,
selecting musical works within the scope of karaoke cassette tapes
61

At a karaoke bar, it sets a karaoke device that can perform musical works
and/or videos showing their lyrics and background movies by running tangible
recording media (cassette tape, laser discs, etc.) or through online. Using the
karaoke device, the customers enjoy singing songs with their accompaniments.
62
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 22 (“The author shall have the
exclusive right to perform his work publicly (“publicly” means for the purpose
of making a work seen or heard directly by the public…).”).
63
See Takeshi Mizuno, Karaoke Bansō ni yoru Kyaku no Kashō ni tsuki
Karaoke Souchi wo Setti Shita Sunakku tou no Keieisha ga Ensōuken Shingai ni
yoru Fuhoukoui Sekinin wo Ou tosareta Jirei [Case Holding that the Manager
of Bar, etc. Who Set the Karaoke Device Is Liable under Tort Theory for
Infringement of Performance Right as to Singing by Customers with
Accompaniment by Karaoke], Saikō Saibansho Hanrei Kaisetsu Minji Hen
[Commentary of the Supreme Court’s Civil Cases](for the year 1988) 150, 158
(1990).
64
It was the name of the defendant’s karaoke bar.
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set by the manager and manipulating the karaoke device by the
employees; and that (2) the manager earned a commercial benefit
through the customers’ performance. 65 The court emphasized two
factors: (1) management and (2) commercial benefit. 66
Beyond the Karaoke bar case, the Karaoke rule has been more
broadly applied to other kinds of services when the provider is
merely an indirect actor, but the customers directly exploit
particular copyrighted works (the so-called “variation” 67 of the
Karaoke rule). 68 For example, a file sharing service using peer-topeer technology was held illegal under the Karaoke rule in
JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō (“File Rogue”). 69 Also, recently, a
65

See JASRAC v. Ju San Fou, 1270 HANREI JIHŌ 34, 35-36 (Sup. Ct., Mar.
15, 1988) (emphasis added).
66
Many subsequent courts applied this rule in Club Cat’s-eye to the similar
cases. See, e.g., JASRAC v. Mitsumasa Iritani, 753 HANREI T AIMUZU 217
(Takamatsu Dis. Ct., Jan. 29, 1991) (“Maharaja”); JASRAC v. Ēsu K.K., 29-1
CHITEKI SAISHŪ 230 (Osaka Dis. Ct., Mar. 17, 1994) (“Miruku” in first
instance); JASRAC v. Ēsu K.K., 29-1 CHITEKI SAISHŪ 213 (Osaka High Ct.,
Feb. 27, 1997) (“Miruku” in appellate instance); JASRAC v. Bideo Meitsu Ltd.,
55 MINSHŪ 185, 1744 HANREI JIHŌ 108 (Sup. Ct., Mar. 2, 2001) (“Night Pub
G7”).
67
In Japanese, it is called “tenyō” of the Karaoke rule. Tamura, supra note
54, at 42, 51.
68
Id. at 51. Professor Yoshiyuki Tamura indicated, “the Karaoke rule was
originally applied to the entities of which it can be said that there is some
personal relationship and personal instructions with the direct using actor, such
as a karaoke bar, a cabaret, or an organizer of performance, a projector, etc.” Id.
at 43.
69
The service name was “File Rogue.” Some lower courts handled this
case. All their decisions adopted the Karaoke rule and held that the service
provider is liable for its users’ direct infringing conduct.
Preliminary injunction cases: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 1780
HANREI JIHŌ 25 (Tokyo D. Ct., Apr. 11, 2002); Nihon Koromubia K.K. v.
Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., 1780 HANREI JIHŌ 25 (Tokyo D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2002).
Principal case [First instance]: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd.,
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070319112218.pdf (Tokyo D.
Ct., Jan. 29, 2003[Heisei14(wa)4237]), Koromubia Myūjikku Enter Teinment
K.K.
v.
Nihon
Emu
Emu
Ō
Ltd.,
available
at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070319112454.pdf (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 29,
2003[Heisei14(wa) 4249]).
Principal case [Appellate instance]: JASRAC v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd.,
available
at
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website for posting and sharing videos was held illegal under the
Karaoke rule in JASRAC v. Just Online K.K. (“TV Break”). 70
Furthermore, as will be introduced later in this Article, some courts
have applied the Karaoke rule or its variation to the placeshifting
cases. Thus, Japanese courts have expanded the scope of direct
liability, rather than expanding indirect liability, as U.S. courts
have done.
Such variation of the Karaoke rule has appeared in Japan
because of its two main merits: (1) a copyright holder can benefit
from injunctive relief according to Article 112 of the Japanese
Copyright Act because the Karaoke rule is directed to the issue of
who is a principal committing copyright infringement; and (2) a
copyright holder can establish a copyright infringement claim
against a service provider even if its customers’ (the direct actors)
physical exploitation of copyrighted works is not regarded as
illegal according to the limitations of copyright, such as the
private use limitation of the reproduction right. 71
3. Limitation on the Reproduction Right for Private Use
The Japanese Copyright Act has no general fair use exception
like the United States. Instead, Japan has explicitly enumerated
limitation provisions depending on each kind of bundle rights and
relevant exploitations. 72
One such limitation is the private use limitation for the
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/7D3D6DF1C0477173492570FC00022330.p
df (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Mar. 31, 2005 [Heisei16(ne)405]); Koromubia Myūjikku
Enter Teinment K.K. v. Nihon Emu Emu Ō Ltd., available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/E7A0B43CB0275AA9492570FC00022333.
pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Mar. 31, 2005 [Heisei16(ne) 446]).
70
The service name is “TV Break” (formerly, “Pandora TV”).
First instance: JASRAC v. Just Online K.K., available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20091215170834.pdf (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov.
13, 2009).
Appellate instance: JASRAC v. Just Online K.K., available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20100909131245.pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct.,
Sep. 8, 2010).
71
See Tamura, supra note 54, at 37-38.
72
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 30-50. Furthermore, most of
these limitations are also applied to neighboring rights. Id. art. 102.
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reproduction right, 73 which exempts the liability for reproducing a
copyrighted work for the purpose of private use:
Article 30. (1) It shall be permissible for a user to
reproduce by himself a work forming the subject
matter of copyright . . . for the purpose of her
personal use, family use or other similar uses within
a limited circle (hereinafter referred to as “private
use”) . . . 74
According to such limitation, each customer of certain Internetrelated services should not be liable for infringement of the
reproduction right provided the use is for a “private use.” 75 Even if
each customer is exempted from liability based on such a
limitation, however, a service provider still may be liable for the
customer’s exploitation of the particular copyrighted works under
the Karaoke rule or its variation.

73

Id. art. 30.
Id. art. 30(1) (emphasis added).
75
For example, in the file sharing service using peer-to-peer technology, if a
user who downloads the illegal data of a musical work and makes a copy on her
or his own PC only for the purpose of listening to it personally, such
reproducing behavior may fall within the “private use.” However, please note
that, after 2009 revision of the Japanese Copyright Act, the user must be illegal
if she or he is aware of infringement at the time of downloading. See id. art.
30(1)(iii).
74
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III. U.S. CASE LAW REGARDING PLACESHIFTING - CABLEVISION
A. Background
In the United States, the Second Circuit recently addressed the
legality of a placeshifting service. In Cartoon Network v. CSC
Holdings (Cablevision), defendant Cablevision was an operator of
a cable television system called the “Remote Storage Digital Video
Recorder” (RS-DVR) 76 The RS-DVR allowed Cablevision
customers to record cable programming on central hard drives
housed and maintained by Cablevision at a remote location. 77 The
customers could then play back those programs through their home
television sets, using only a remote control and a standard cable
box equipped with the RS-DVR software. 78 The plaintiffs, who
owned copyrights on various movies and television programs, sued
Cablevision for declaratory and injunctive relief. 79
The central device of Cablevision’s RS-DVR was the Arroyo
Server. The Arroyo Server consisted of two data buffers 80 and a
number of high-capacity hard disks. 81 The entire stream of TV
program data moved to the first buffer regardless of whether any
customers requested to record that program. 82 If a certain customer
had requested a particular program, the data of that requested
program moved from the first buffer to the secondary buffer, and
then onto a portion of one of the hard disks allocated to that
customer. 83 Even when different customers requested to record the
same television program simultaneously, “separate copies [were]
made for each requesting customer.” 84 The first buffer held the
data for each television program at any moment for no more than
76

See Figure 1, Appendix.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Buffers are “forms of random access memory that hold data for a brief
amount of time, usually shortly before use, typically to improve the performance
of the computer or other digital device.” Woodford, supra note 7, at 5.
81
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Woodford, supra note 7, at 6.
77
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0.1 seconds, and the second buffer held the data for no more than
1.2 seconds. 85 After that, the data residing on the buffers was
automatically erased and replaced with newer data. 86
According to a customer’s request, the Arroyo Server
transmitted its data to the customer. 87 As a result, the customer was
able to view the requested program every time and everywhere as
long as he or she was connected with the Internet. 88 In contrast, if
there was no request to record, the data in the first buffer would be
automatically overwritten and deleted without moving to the
second buffer or any portion of the hard disks. 89
In Cablevision, interestingly, the parties voluntarily limited the
issue only to direct infringement. 90 The plaintiffs alleged that
Cablevision directly infringed:
(1) the reproduction right by recording TV program
data in a buffer of the Arroyo Server;
(2) the reproduction right by recording programs in
HDs allocated for each customer; and
(3) the public performance right by transmitting the
recorded program data to customers. 91

85

Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124-25.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Prior to filing a lawsuit, through mutual bargaining, the plaintiffs agreed
not to argue secondary liability. In consideration, Cablevision agreed not to
argue the fair use defense. The parties’ intent was to “use this case to ‘set a
standard for copyright protection in the marketplace of automated access to and
delivery of copyrighted works.’” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Cable News Network v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), at
11. Also, the plaintiffs were unwilling to suggest that private use of DVRs
violated the rights of the audience. See Jon M. Garon, Colloquium: The Second
Annual Conference on Innovation and Communication Law, 48 U. LOUISVILLE
L. REV. 771, 784 (2010).
91
See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 125; see also Attorney General’s Amicus
brief, 129 S. Ct. 2890 at (I).
86

172

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 7:2

B. The District Court Decision
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
on all three issues and granted their request for declaratory and
injunctive relief. 92
C. The Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit reversed/vacated the district court’s
decision, denying the establishment of direct infringement for all
three issues. 93 The most relevant issue with relationship to the
volition requirement is issue two (concerning recording in HDs).
This Article will now compare this issue with Japanese law.
1. The Volition Standard
The core of issue two concerns “the authorship of the
infringing conduct.” 94 In the recording process of RS-DVR, “a
copy of the program – a copyrighted work – resides on the hard
disks of Cablevision’s Arroyo Server.”95 Thus, the central question
was “who made this copy;” 96 in other words, who [was] the maker
of such a copy, Cablevision or its customer? 97 If Cablevision made
the copy, then it directly infringed the reproduction right of the
plaintiffs’ works; if its customer made the copy, then Cablevision
would not be liable for direct infringement, although it may face a
secondary liability claim. 98
As a standard for deciding this issue, the Second Circuit
applied the volition requirement from Netcom, which stated, “there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is
92

Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Cablevision Sys., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
93
See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Woodford, supra note 7, at 8.
98
See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130.
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lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy
by a third party.” 99 The Second Circuit drew its reasoning from the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 100 which
had endorsed Netcom:
[T]o establish direct liability under . . . the Act,
something more must be shown than mere
ownership of a machine used by others to make
illegal copies. There must be actual infringing
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal
to the illegal copying that one could conclude that
the machine owner himself trespassed on the
exclusive domain of the copyright holder. 101
2. Application of the Volition Standard to Cablevision’s RS-DVR
Applying the volition standard, the Second Circuit identified
two volitional acts in the RS-DVR context: (1) “Cablevision’s
conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists
only to produce a copy;” and (2) “a customer’s conduct in ordering
that system to produce a copy of a specific program.” 102 The court
assessed these volitional acts between Cablevision and its
customers in the RS-DVR and held that they were the same as
those in a VCR, where its maker may not be liable for direct
infringement concerning its users’ infringing act by the recorder:
In the case of a VCR, it seems clear … that the
operator of the VCR, the person who actually
presses the button to make the recording, supplies
the necessary element of volition, not the person
who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from
the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe
that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently
distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability
as a direct infringer on a different party for copies
that are made automatically upon that customer’s
99

Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370 (emphasis added).
CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 373 F.3d 544, 550-55 (4th Cir. 2004).
101
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 130 (citing CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550).
102
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131.
100
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command. 103
Also, considering the volitional conduct in this case, the court
distinguished the RS-DVR from a copy shop service whereby an
employee of the shop makes copies of a certain book from a
customer’s request to make a copy. 104
Further, although the district court emphasized Cablevision’s
“unfettered discretion in selecting the programming that it would
make available for recording,” 105 the Second Circuit denied that
such discretion should affect the issue of direct infringement.
Accordingly, it held that Cablevision’s discretion did not extend to
selecting to record a particular program and was less than that of a
video-on-demand provider. 106
In conclusion, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision did not
commit any volitional conduct by copying the plaintiffs’
copyrighted television programs on hard disks of the Arroyo
103

Id.
The court stated:
In determining who actually “makes” a copy, a significant
difference exists between making a request to a human
employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system
to make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system,
which automatically obeys commands and engages in no
volitional conduct…. Here, by selling access to a system that
automatically produces copies on command, Cablevision more
closely resembles a store proprietor who charges customers to
use a photocopier on his premises, and it seems incorrect to
say, without more, that such a proprietor “makes” any copies
when his machines are actually operated by his customers.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131-32 (emphasis added).
105
Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
106
The court stated that
[T]his control is limited to the channels of programming
available to a customer and not to the programs themselves.
Cablevision has no control over what programs are made
available on individual channels or when those programs will
air, if at all. In this respect, Cablevision possesses far less
control over recordable content than it does in the video on
demand context, where it actively selects and makes available
beforehand the individual programs available for viewing.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132.
104
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Server, and thus Cablevision should not be liable for direct
infringement of the reproduction right.
D. The Supreme Court Denies Certiorari
Although the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, the
Court denied certiorari on June 29, 2009, 107 as recommended by
the Solicitor General in an amicus brief. 108
E. Remaining Problems of Volition Standard in Cablevision 109
1. Significance of the Volition Standard in Cablevision
The Second Circuit in Cablevision became the first federal
107

Cable News Network v. CSC Holdings, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
The Solicitor General stated that Cablevision is not suitable for the US
Supreme Court’s uniform decision because two other “critical issues” –
contributory infringement and fair use – had been removed by the parties such
that the Supreme Court cannot wholly address these critical issues. See Attorney
General’s Amicus brief, 129 S. Ct. 2890, at 6.
109
There are some articles annotating Cablevision. See, e.g., [U.S.]
Woodford, supra note 7; Ginsburg, supra note 34; Irene M. Pla, This Picture Is
Coming in Fussy: Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings Blurs the Line between
Direct and Secondary Copyright Infringement, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 85 (2010);
Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v.
CSC Holdings, 89 OR. L. REV. 505 (2010); Fernando M. Pinguelo and Bradford
W. Muller, Avoid the Rainy Day: Survey of U.S. Cloud Computing Caselaw,
2011 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 011101 (2011), Joshua C. Liederman,
Changing the Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 289 (2011); [Japan] Kōji Okumura, Nettowākugata
DVR Sisutemu no Uneisya ga Chokusetsu Shingai Sekinin wo Ouka Inaka ga
Arasowareta Beikoku Jirei [Whether or Not an Operator of Network-Type DVR
System is Liable for Direct Infringement] - The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v.
CSC Holdings, Inc. 536 F.3d 121 2nd Cir. 2008), 117 SOFTIC LAW NEWS
(2008); Yukiko Sakai, Beikoku CableVision Hanketsu to Nichibei no
Chosakuken Shingai Sekinin nitaisuru Kangaekata-Liability for Copyright
Infringement on Cablevision Case and Its Implication for Japan, 49 INFOCOM
REVIEW 37 (2009); Takashi Yamada, Beikoku Chizai Jūyō Hanrei Syōkai:
Nettowaaku wo Riyō Shita Hōsōrokuga･Soushin Saabisu to Chosakuken Shingai
no Seihi [Whether or Not the Service of Recording and Transmitting Broadcasts
through Network Infringes Copyright]-The Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc. US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-, 37-6 Kokusai Shōji
Hōmu 828 (2009).
108
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appellate court to apply the volition requirement to “services not
accessible via the internet.” 110 Requiring this volition element, the
court “found no substantive difference between supplying a freestanding recording device that a user operates at home and
supplying a remote digital recording system that the user operates
from home.” 111 As a result, it can be said that Cablevision
diminished uncertainty regarding the legality of the placeshifting
service. 112
2. Criticism of the Volition Requirement in Cablevision
The district court in Cablevision refused to adopt the volition
requirement, differentiating the placeshifting in Cablevision from
the ISP in Netcom. 113 The ISP at issue in Netcom was a “‘mere
conduit’ online service provider, which simply conveyed copies of
works from one subscriber to another.” 114 In contrast,
“Cablevision’s own transmissions [were] the source of the copies
the subscribers request.” 115 Thus, the district court reasoned that
Cablevision had more power to control the content stream; in other
110

Woodford, supra note 7, at 8. The case decisions requiring the volition
element before Cablevision are related to the ISP’s liability. See supra note 40.
111
Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15.
112
Prof. Ginsburg says,
The Second Circuit’s determination that a business which
establishes and manages an automated system that invites end
users to request the making of copies which it stores for the
users for subsequent communication to them lacks the agency
sufficient for direct liability for infringement of the
reproduction right, and could herald the development of
business models designed to elude copyright control over the
exploitation of works, particularly in a technological
environment in which pervasive automation is increasingly
foreseeable.
Id. Also, Mr. Zimmerman and Mr. Woodford indicated the volition requirement
in Cablevision is important because it succeeds in making uncertainty of the
DMCA safe harbor (17 U.S.C. §512) less relevant to the extent of direct
infringement for technology companies and entertainment conduits. See
Woodford, supra note 7, at 10.
113
See Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
114
Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 15.
115
Id.
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words, Cablevision had an option not only to distribute, but also to
remove, any content if it found that such content would constitute
copyright infringement. 116
However, “Cablevision’s ‘continuing relationship’ with its RSDVR customers, its control over recordable content, and the
‘instrumental[ity]’ of copying to the RS-DVR system . . . seem . . .
more relevant to the question of contributory liability.” 117 They do
not relate to Cablevision’s direct infringement liability because, in
a direct infringement claim, the court should decide whether a
defendant service provider makes “copies” of a particular
copyrighted work by itself. Even if a provider has power to control
the general content stream, such power does not necessarily mean
that the provider makes “copies” of a particular copyrighted work.
Thus, it should not be relevant to the direct infringement issue. 118
3. Secondary Liability of a Placeshifting Provider
The Solicitor General stated in its amicus brief that secondary
liability can be another legal issue in these situations. 119 However,
the outcome seems to be negative because, in order to establish the
secondary liability claim, there must be an illegal direct
infringement. 120
Nonetheless, a general customer of the RSDVR might establish a fair use defense for his or her conduct
under the well-established doctrine in Sony 121 as long as it uses the
service for a private use.122 Accordingly, Cablevision might not be
secondarily liable.
In discussing the establishment of fair use, the impact by the
placeshifting service on the television content market may be

116

See Cablevision, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 132; see also Woodford, supra note 7, at 10.
118
See Woodford, supra note 7, at 9.
119
See supra note 108.
120
See supra Chapter II.A.2.b.
121
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 447-56.
122
That is because the customer’s placeshifting use in the RS-DVR has
little difference from the timeshifting use of Sony’s Betamax. See Woodford,
supra note 7, at 10; Bartley, supra note 49, at 558-59; Pla, supra note 109, at
102.
117
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considerable. 123 Because the placeshifting service is so convenient
and attractive for many audiences, it could have some effect on the
existing content market. However, the Supreme Court ruled in
Sony:
[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted
work need not be prohibited in order to protect the
author’s incentive to create. . . . A challenge to a
noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires
proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that
if it should become widespread, it would adversely
affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work. 124
Thus, it is possible that the placeshifting use by an individual
user may fall within fair use until any substantial harm on the
television content market is proven. Furthermore, because the
placeshifting service “only provides access to the same video that
is available on a home television, and Internet content providers
can offer greater options,” 125 the placeshifting might still be fair
use like the Betamax in Sony, even though the RS-DVR will have
some market impact. 126 Therefore, even if copyright holders sued
Cablevision for contributory infringement, Cablevision might not

123

The impact of the placeshifting service on the TV contents market can
be considered in the fourth factor of fair use exception. See 17 U.S.C. §107(4)
(“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.”.). Ms. Sakai indicates, “[i]n the case of the library purpose
that a customer records for the purpose of viewing continuously later, there is a
possibility that such conduct would not be deemed as fair use if it affects the
package market such as a video cassette or a DVD according to the
consideration in the US.” Sakai, supra note 109, at 49.
124
Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51.
125
Bartley, supra note 49, at 558.
126
Id. at 558-59; see also Rivers, supra note 4, at 188-91. Professor Rivers
introduced possible policies in favor of affirming fair use. According to her, they
are “to prevent the chilling innovation . . . that it is undermined whether
copyright owners have or will suffer any net damages as a result of placeshifting
technologies” and “that it encourages mobility among the populace, and that
banning it would suppress one’s constitutional right to travel.” Id. at 188-91.
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be liable if the plaintiffs are unable to prove market harm. 127
4. Hypothetical Cases where Placeshifting Might Be Illegal under
the Volition Requirement
Even under the volition requirement in Cablevision, every
placeshifting service may not necessarily be legal. So, under what
circumstances might a placeshifting service be illegal? If a
placeshifting provider allows its customers to record and view
unlicensed television programs, such circumstance can justify
liability for copyright infringement. 128 This is because the
provider, in these hypothetical assumptions, stores and distributes
on demand the content that each customer should individually
obtain authorization from the copyright holder to view.
5. Conclusion
The volition requirement might be a preferable tool to reduce
the uncertainty of liability for placeshifting services. Under this
requirement, a placeshifting provider can offer its service legally,
like Cablevision, by creating a service structure where the copying
of a specific copyright work automatically occurs at the demand of
127

See Woodford, supra note 7, at 10; Pla, supra note 109, at 102-05. But
see Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 17. Professor Ginsburg indicated a possibility
that the case law may deny establishment of fair use defense if business entity
does copy on behalf of its user. Id. at 17. Also, Professor Brunstad has indicated
the possibility that contributory liability can be established on a service provider
of placeshifting according to US law. Jonathan Griffith & Signe Brunstad,
RCLIP Tokubetsu Seminā – Hōsō Kontentsu no Tensō wo Meguru Shisutemu
Teikyosya Tou no Chosakuken Hō Jyō no Sekinin – Eibei no Jōkyō wo Humaete
[RCLIP Special Seminar – Liability of Provider of System Regarding
Transmission of Broadcast Contents under Copyright Law– Considering
Situations in the UK and the US], in Chizai Nenpō 2008 (NBL Supplement No.
123) [IP Annual Report 2008 (Bessatsu NBL No. 1123)] 309, 329 (2008).
However, even according to Professor Ginsburg, it is still unclear
which circumstances cause the conclusion that the customer’s non-commercial
copying conduct in RS-DVR does not constitute fair use.
128
See Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 16. Professor Ginsburg also indicates,
“[i]f Cablevision simply redirected the signal to those customers, it would be
directly liable for violating the copyright owner’s public performance rights.” Id.
at 16-17.
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each customer. 129
IV. JAPANESE CASE LAW REGARDING PLACESHIFTING
A. Background
Table 1 at the end of this Article shows the outcome of
Japanese cases regarding placeshifting. 130 In Japan, meanwhile, the
legality of placeshifting services centers mainly on whether a
service provider falls within the definition of a principal
committing copyright infringement, because there is no secondary
liability theory in Japanese copyright law. Most courts have
applied an overall consideration standard such as the Karaoke rule
or its variation to this issue. Because courts apply an overall
consideration standard, however, it is difficult to find the critical
factor that would make a placeshifting service legal or illegal.
B. Rokuga Net 131
1. Facts 132
Rokuga Net was a service that enabled its customers who lived
abroad to view Japanese television programs. 133 The service
provider was FA Vision, Inc. The provider placed personal
computers called “TV-personal computers” together with
129

Also, in Cablevision, the Second Circuit held no infringement of public
performance right by transmitting the recorded program data from a central
server to each customer. A service provider can benefit from that holding.
130
See Table 1, Appendix.
131
First instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, 1895 HANREI JIHŌ 120
(Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 7, 2004).
Objection instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, Unpublished
(Tokyo D. Ct., May 31, 2005).
Appellate instance: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. FA Vision, available at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.
pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Nov. 15, 2005).
132
See
Rokuga
Net,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.pdf, at 1-4 [Appellate instance].
133
See Figure 2, Appendix.
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television tuners having the function of receiving and recording
television programs at its office. FA Vision allocated the TVpersonal computers to each user, and connected them with a
television antenna to enable them to receive television programs.
Each user operated his or her own TV-personal computer from
home through the Internet to reserve recordings of programs and
could transmit the recorded files to his or her own personal
computer located at home or even overseas. In addition, FA Vision
and its customers agreed that each customer owned the TVpersonal computer allocated to that user. Another characteristic of
this service was that each user must access FA Vision’s website
with a password to request the recording and transmitting of TV
programs.
The Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japanese Broadcasting Enterprise)
sued FA Vision, seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin FA
Vision from infringing the organization’s “reproduction right.” 134
2. Court Decisions
The Tokyo District Court found that FA Vision was the
principal committing infringement of the “reproduction right,” and
granted an injunction. 135 The Intellectual Property High Court 136
(IPHC) affirmed the district court’s decision 137 and concluded that
FA Vision was the principal committing infringement of the
“reproduction right” by wholly considering the actions, or lack
134

Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 98.
See Rokuga Net, 1895 HANREI JIHŌ at 127 [First instance].
136
The Intellectual Property High Court is one of the courts of appeal in
Japan. It “was established on April 1, 2005 as a court specializing in intellectual
property cases, which consists of the Special Division to deal with Grand Panel
cases and other four divisions.” Intellectual Property High Court,
http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/current.html (last visited May 26, 2011).
Unlike the US court of appeal, the Japanese court of appeal is basically
allowed not only to review the lower court’s decisions but also to do fact-finding
by themselves. Depending on the case, the Japanese courts of appeal may hear
witnesses.. See MAKOTO ITŌ, MINJI SOSYŌ HŌ [CIVIL PROCEDURE], 630-31
(rev. ed. 2002).
137
See
Rokuga
Net,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
842BD42DCC4020FC492570C100253DFF.pdf, at 6 [Appellate instance].
135
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thereof, of Rokuga Net, such as: (1) all related apparatuses were
owned and installed by FA Vision in its office (the court held the
agreement that the customer owned the TV-personal computer to
be merely fictitious); (2) FA Vision limited the scope of broadcast
programs which could be transmitted; (3) a customer could not use
the service without accessing FA Vision’s website each time; (4)
FA Vision continuously gave support service to its customers; and
(5) FA Vision advertised its service and received profits through
service fees termed monthly maintenance fees. 138

138

See id. at 4-5 [Appellate instance].
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C. Maneki TV139
1. Facts 140
Like Rokuga Net, Maneki TV was a service that enabled its
139

Preliminary injunction case [First instance]: Nihon Terebi Hōsō Mō
K.K. v. Nagano Syōten, 1234 HANREI TAIMUZU 278 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 4,
2006).
Preliminary injunction case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Terebi Hōsō Mō
available
at
K.K.
v.
Nagano
Syōten
K.K.,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20061222154234.pdf (INTELL. HIGH Ct.,
Dec. 22, 2006).
Principal case [First instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten K.K.,
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080623111341.pdf (Tokyo D.
Ct., June 20, 2008).
Principal case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf
(INTELL. HIGH Ct., Dec. 15, 2008).
Principal case [Supreme Court]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nagano Syōten
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf
(Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 2011).
There are some articles annotating Maneki TV. See, e.g., Fumio Sakka,
Hōsō Bangumi no Rokuga/Haishin Sarbisu to Chosakuken Seido – Shiteki Riyō
to Gyō Teki Riyō no Kyōkai Ryōiki no Chitsujyo Keisei – [Services of Recording
and Distributing Broadcasting Programs and Copyright System – Establishment
of an Order for Border Area between Private Use and Commercial Use], 576
Kopiraito [Copyright] 33 (2009); Yutaka Sato, Chosakubutsu no Tekihouriyou
notameno Syudanteikyou no Zehi -Rokuraku II Jiken Kousoshin Hanketsu wo
Daizai ni– [Whether Providing Means for Legal Use of Copyrighted Work
Should be Allowed or Not –Considering the Decision by Court of Appeal in
Rokuraku II Case-], 26 Chitekizaisan Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 75, 98 (2010);
Yutaka Sato, “Terebi Hōsō wo Internet Kaisen wo Keiyusite Shichōsuru
Sityōsuru Sisutemu” wo Siyōsurutameno Setsubi Teikyō no Zehi – Maneki TV
jiken – [Whether Providing Facilities for Use for the “System of Viewing TV
Programs through Internet Networking” Should be Allowed or Not – Maneki TV
case - ], 15 Chitekizaisan Houseisakugaku Kenkyu 243 (2007); Keiji Kondō,
Zaikyō Hōsō no Kaigai Shichō Kanōka to Chosakuken Hō – Maneki TV jiken
[Making National Broadcasts Viewable Abroad and Copyright Law], 44 LAW &
TECH. 57 (2009), Tetsuya Imamura, Terebi Hōsō wo Internet Kaisen wo
Keiyushite Setsuzoku Suru Shisutemu wo Siyō Suru Tame no Setsubi Teikyō no
Tekihōsei ga Arasowareta Jirei [Case Discussing the Legality of Providing
Facilities to Use a System of Viewing TV Broadcasts through Internet Network],
Apr. 6, 2009, LEX/DB No. 25440151.
140
See
Maneki
TV,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
20080623111341.pdf, at 3-7, 70-84 [First instance of principal case].
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customers who lived abroad to view Japanese television
programs. 141 The service provider was Nagano Syōten K.K. The
most characteristic feature of Maneki TV was the use of a
commercially available placeshifting device called “Location
Free,” made by Sony. 142 Location Free consisted of a device called
a “Base Station” that converted television broadcasts into digital
data and transmitted them to a customer’s personal viewing device
through an individual customer’s remote control. 143 In Maneki TV,
a customer must purchase the Location Free device on his or her
own and then must deliver it to Nagano Syōten.
Thus, Nagano Syōten did not provide the Location Free device
to its customers. 144 Nagano Syōten only provided its office as a
place to connect the Base Stations. Unlike the RS-DVR in
Cablevision, Nagano Syōten did not operate any sole central server
device, but instead set multiple Base Stations delivered to them by
each customer. The other characteristic of this service was that the
Base Station had only a transmitting function and no recording
function. Therefore, only the issues of whether Maneki TV
infringes the “right of public transmission” 145 and the “right of
making a work transmittable” 146 were discussed. The “right of
141

See Figure 3, Appendix.
See supra note 20.
143
A customer can substitute his own personal computer connected to the
Internet for the personal viewer device.
144
Nagano Syōten merely posted an Internet link to Sony’s website, which
introduces Location Free, on its own homepage.
145
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1). Article 2(1)(viibis)
defined the “public transmission” as:
the transmission of radio communication or wiretelecommunication intended for direct reception by the public,
excluding the transmission (other than that of program works)
by telecommunication installations, one part of which is
located on the same premises where the other part is located
or, if the premises are occupied by two or more persons, both
parts of which are located within the area therein occupied by
one person.
(emphasis added).
146
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1) and art. 99bis. Article
2(1)(viibis) defined the “making transmittable” as:
142
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making a work transmittable” is the right to prevent an infringer’s
act of uploading illegal contents as prior stage of public
transmission, which in turn is covered by the “right of public
transmission.” 147
2. Court Decisions
In Maneki TV, a total of four lower-court decisions were
issued, both in the preliminary-injunction case 148 and the principal
case. 149 All lower courts concluded that Maneki TV did not
[T]he putting in such a state that the interactive
transmission can be made by either of the following acts:
(a) to record information on public transmission memory
of an interactive transmission server already connected with
telecommunication networks for public use (“interactive
transmission server” means a device which, when connected
with telecommunication networks for public use, has a
function of making the interactive transmission of information
which is either recorded on such a part of its memory as used
for the interactive transmission (hereinafter in this item
referred to as “public transmission memory”) or inputted to
such device; the same shall apply hereinafter), to add a
memory recording information as a public transmission
memory of such an interactive transmission server, to convert
such a memory recording information into a public
transmission memory of such an interactive transmission
server, or to input information to such an interactive
transmission server;
(b) to connect with telecommunication networks for
public use an interactive transmission server which records
information on its public transmission memory or which
inputs information to itself. In this case, where a connection is
made through a series of acts such as wiring, starting of an
interactive transmission server or putting into operation of
programs for transmission or reception, the last occurring one
of these acts shall be considered to constitute the connection.
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, Article 2(1)(viibis)..
147
As a result, copyright holder may more efficiently prevent an illegal
public transmission of his copyright work.
148
In a preliminary injunction case, a petitioner of “preliminary injunction”
may seek only interim injunction against an infringer.
149
In a principal case (meaning a general civil lawsuit), a plaintiff may
seek both permanent injunction and monetary damage.
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infringe the “right of making a work transmittable” or the “right of
public transmission.”
a. Early decisions
Two district court decisions and one IPHC decision in the
preliminary injunction case found that Nagano Syōten was not the
principal committing copyright infringement by wholly
considering the contents of Maneki TV. These decisions noted that
one Base Station only had the function of transmission to one
individual customer; that is, it made transmission between “1-to1,” but not between “1-to-many.” 150 Thus, these three decisions
have been considered as examples of a variation of the Karaoke
rule. 151
b. Intellectual Property High Court’s decision in the principal
case
In contrast, the IPHC in the principal case did not directly
discuss the scope of the principal committing infringement. As to
the claim of infringement of the “right of making a work
transmittable,” the IPHC held that the system within Nagano
Syōten’s office setting each customer’s Base Station did not
constitute an “interactive transmission server” 152 because “each
Base Station could only make transmission to a particular and sole
private monitor or personal computer and merely had the so-called
‘1 to 1’ transmitting function.” 153
Next, as to the claim of infringement of the “right of public
transmission,” the IPHC held that the transmission from Nagano
Syōten’s office to many customers through the Internet did not
150

See Maneki TV, 1234 HANREI T AIMUZU at 292 [First instance of
preliminary
injunction
case],
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
20061222154234.pdf, at 11 [Appellate instance of preliminary injunction case],
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20080623111341.pdf, at 87 [First instance of
principal case].
151
Sato, supra note 139, at 75.
152
See supra note 146.
153
Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf,
at 25-26 [Appellate instance of principal case].
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constitute such an infringement because:
[Nagano Syōten] not only never decided to transmit
the digital data to each user’s monitor or PC
individually but also was never involved with such a
decision made by each user. . . . Whether the
transmission of digital data from each Base Station
to the corresponding monitor or PC of each user
exists or not depended on a decision by each user
completely. 154
c. Supreme Court’s decision in the principal case
The Supreme Court reversed the IPHC’s decision and held that
Nagano Syōten was the principal committing infringement of both
the “right of making a work transmittable” and the “right of public
transmission.” The court interpreted “the principal [of interactive
transmission] as an entity creating a state where a device at issue
was capable of automatically transmitting information in response
to a request from a receiver.” 155 Further, the court held, “if the
device was connected with telecommunication networks for public
use and information was continuously inputted on the device, an
entity which inputted the information on the device should be
considered as the principal of transmission.” 156 The court then
applied this standard to Maneki TV and held that a Base Station157
constituted an “interactive transmission server,” and that Nagano
Syōten was the principal of public transmission because its
customer fell within the public:
Because anyone might use [Maneki TV] solely by
entering into its service contract with [Nagano
Syōten] regardless of relationship, etc. with it, the
154

Id. at 31-32[Appellate instance of principal case](emphasis added).
Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf, at
5 [Supreme Court of principal case].
156
Id. (emphasis added).
157
The Supreme Court stated “each Base Station” but the collection of all
customer’s Base Stations at the Nagano Syōten’s office. Thus, we can
understand the Supreme Court held that an individual Base Station constitutes
an “interactive transmission server.”
155
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customer fell within the public as an unspecific
person from the viewpoint of [Nagano Syōten].158
Unlike the IPHC, the Supreme Court held that a Basestation’s
“1 to 1” transmitting function did not matter. 159
D. Rokuraku II160
1. Facts 161
Rokuraku II was similar to Maneki TV in that it had
individual recording/transmitting devices (named “Parent Device
Rokuraku,” which is equivalent to the “Base Station” in Maneki

158

Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110118164443.pdf,
at 5 [Supreme Court of principal case] (emphasis added).
159
Id. at 6 [Supreme Court of principal case].
160
Preliminary injunction case: Tokyo Hōsō K.K. v. Nihon Digital Kaden
K.K., available at http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20070330182742.pdf
(Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 30, 2007).
Principal case [First instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital Kaden
K.K., 2029 HANREI JIHŌ 125 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 29, 2008).
Principal case [Appellate instance]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital
Kaden
K.K.,
available
at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
20090224172114.pdf (INTELL. HIGH CT., Jan. 27, 2009).
Principal case [Supreme Court]: Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai v. Nihon Digital
Kaden
K.K.,
available
at
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
20110120144645.pdf (Sup. Ct., Jan. 20, 2011).
There are some articles annotating Rokuraku II. See, e.g., Sakka, supra note
139; Sato, supra note 139; Kunitoshi Oka, Zoku/ Chosakuken no Jikenbo (121)
[Cont. Case List of Copyright (121)], 56-3 JCA JOURNAL 62 (2009); Naoki
Mizutani, Terebi Hōsō Bangumi no Rokuga, Tensō Sarbisu no Sikumi ga
Chosakuken Tou wo Shingai Shiteinai to Handan Sareta Jirei [Case Ruling That
A System of A Service of Recording and Transmitting TV Broadcasting
Programs Does Not Infringe Copyright, etc.], 106-5 Hatsumei [The Invention]
40 (2009); Takashi Chōsa, Hanrei Hyōsyaku – “Rokuraku II” Jiken Kōsoshin
Hanketsu (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Jan. 27, 2009) [Case Review - Appellate Court
Decision in “Rokuraku II” case (INTELL. HIGH Ct., Jan. 27, 2009)], 62-6 Patent
29 (2009),;Tetsuya Imamura, Terebi Bangumi Rokuga Sichō Sarbisu ni Okeru
Fukusei no Syutai ni Tsuite Arasowareta Jirei [Case Discussing the Principal of
reproducing in a Service of Recording and Viewing TV Programs], Sep. 7,
2009, LEX/DB No. 25440283.
161
See Rokuraku II, 2029 HANREI JIHŌ at 127-128, 141-46 [First instance
of principal case].

2011]

LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS GROUP FEATURE ARTICLE

189

TV) allocated to each customer in the service provider’s office. 162
Only the method used for procuring the devices differed. In
Rokuraku II, the service provider lent to the customer its own
original products (the Parent Device Rokuraku, which was set in
the provider’s place, together with a set-top device named the
“Child Device Rokuraku,” which was set in each customer’s
home) while, in Maneki TV, each customer had to purchase the
Location Free including Base Station, a commercially available
placeshifting device. Furthermore, unlike the Base Station in
Maneki TV, the Parent Device Rokuraku had both recording and
transmitting functions.
In the beginning, Nihon Digital Kaden K.K., the provider of
Rokuraku II, started by monitoring its business and placed the
Parent Devices Rokuraku within its office. However, after starting
its regular service, it contended that the Parent Devices Rokuraku
were set in a different entity’s office, but not in its own office.
Plaintiffs, major television broadcasting companies, sued
Nihon Digital Kaden, alleging that it infringed their “reproduction
rights” to the plaintiffs’ TV programs and TV broadcasts.
2. Court Decisions
a. Tokyo District Court’s decision in the principal case
The Tokyo District Court in the principal case held that Nihon
Digital Kaden was the principal reproducing the TV programs
through Rokuraku II and granted injunctive relief and monetary
damages. Referring to the Karaoke rule, the district court reached
its conclusion by considering that: (i) the purpose of the service
was to allow its customers to obtain copied data from Japanese TV
programs; (ii) the Parent Devices Rokuraku were located under
Nihon Digital Kaden’s management; (iii) Nihon Digital Kaden
provided its customers the monetary-preferable option to trust
Nihon Digital Kaden with the Parent Device Rokuraku; (iv) Nihon
Digital Kaden set the area of recordable TV programs; and (v)
Nihon Digital Kaden earned the initial registration fee and the
162

See Figure 4, Appendix.
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rents. 163
This decision has been categorized as one of the variations of
the Karaoke rule. 164
b. Intellectual Property High Court’s decision
The IPHC reversed the district court’s decision. 165
Contradicting the district court, the IPHC held that the above (i) to
(v) factors considered by the district court could never be a reason
to conclude that Nihon Digital Kaden was the principal committed
infringement of “reproduction rights.” 166 The court reasoned that
Rokuraku II only supported each customer’s legal acts of
reproduction. That is, the court held that each customer’s
reproducing acts through the Parent and Child devices “should be
legal as private use set forth in Article 30(1) of the Japanese
Copyright Act.”167 Then, the court noted that Rokuraku II that:
merely provided the environment and the conditions
to ease the legal acts of reproduction by the users’
free will. . . . Because this service provided the
circumstances and the conditions, etc. for the users’
legal private use, there was no room that such legal
acts converted into illegal ones, and thus the
reasonable benefit of the Appellees [note: copyright
holders] could not be harmed even if users of
Rokuraku II would increase and accumulate. 168
In addition, the IPHC explicitly denied applying the Karaoke
rule in Club Cat’s-eye 169 on the ground that the factual basis in
Club Cat’s-eye was clearly different from placeshifting cases. 170
163

See Id. at 146-50 [First instance of principal case].
See Sato, supra note 139, at 100.
165
Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf,
at 33 [Appellate instance of principal case].
166
See id. at 25-31.
167
Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
168
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
169
See infra Chapter II.B.2.
170
Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf,
at 33 [Appellate instance of principal case].
164
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c. Supreme Court’s decision
The Supreme Court reversed the IPHC’s decision. 171 The court
applied the overall consideration standard for determining the
principal conducting a reproduction and then held that the critical
factor was whether a reproduction of the TV broadcast by a
reproducing device is made under a service provider’s
management and control. 172 The Supreme Court remanded the
case for further judgment on who or how to manage and control
the Parent Device Rokuraku because Nihon Digital Kaden
contested that it was not set in its own office. 173
E. Yoridorimidori 174
1. Facts 175
Although service content was different from those of Rokuga
Net, Maneki TV, and Rokuraku II, Yoridorimidori also held that the
placeshifting service at issue liable. Yoridorimidori was a central
system that could record television programs for residents of an
apartment building. 176 The system consisted of a central server that
recorded and transmitted the data of television programs and settop viewers that were located in each room and received the data,
converting it to visual and sound signals. Using the viewer, each
resident could view the recorded programs in his or her own
apartment. The characteristic of this system was that the central
server made only one copy of a particular program even if multiple
171

The Supreme Court has three panels. The handling panel in Rokuraku
II was different from that in Maneki TV.
172
See
Rokuraku
II,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20110120144645.pdf, at 4 [Supreme Court
of Principal case].
173
Id.
174
First instance: Mainichi Hōsō K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1911
HANREI JIHŌ 65 (Osaka D. Ct., Oct. 24, 2005).
Appellate instance: Mainichi Hōsō K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1991
HANREI JIHŌ 122 (Osaka HIGH Ct., June 14, 2007).
175
See Yoridorimidori, 1991 HANREI JIHŌ at134-36 [Appellate instance].
176
See Figure 5, Appendix.
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residents requested that program. Using only the data from one
copy, the central server transmitted it to each resident’s viewing
device. Kuromusaizu K.K., the maker of Yoridorimidori, provided
fee-based maintenance service by remote control for apartment
buildings introducing this system.
The plaintiffs, television broadcasting companies, sued
defendant Kuromusaizu, alleging that this system infringed the
plaintiffs’ “reproduction right,” “right of public transmission,” 177
and “right of making a work transmittable” 178 for their TV
programs and TV broadcastings.
2. Court Decisions
a. The Osaka District Court’s decision
The Osaka District Court held that Kuromusaizu was not
the principal committing copyright infringement under the
Karaoke rule. 179 However, the court granted an injunction by
applying Article 112(1) 180 of the Japanese Copyright Act, a
statutory basis of injunctive relief, to this case. 181 Among Japanese
case law, such a holding was exceptional because the court
extended the Copyright Act to reach a new situation by analogy. 182
177
178

Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1); see supra note 145.
Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 23(1), 99bis.; see supra note

146.
179

See Yoridorimidori, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ at 92 [First instance].
See infra Chapter II.B.1.
181
See Yoridorimidori, 1911 HANREI JIHŌ at 93-94 [First instance]. The
characteristic of this theory is that, instead of enlarging the scope of the principal
committing copyright infringement, it interprets the plain language “those who
infringe or are likely to infringe” in Article 112(1) of the Japanese Copyright
Act as the term that has broad meanings, including not only a person who
directly does the exploitations set forth in Japanese Copyright Act but also a
person who merely indirectly assists the direct actor. See Tamura, supra note 54,
at 38-39; see also, FUMIO SAKKA, CHOSAKUKEN HŌ [COPYRIGHT ACT], 803-10
(3d. ed. 2004).
182
From the practical point of view, the weakest point of this theory is that
no courts other than the Osaka District Court adopt it. Tamura, supra note 54, at
38-39. There are only two such decisions: Yoridorimidori and JASRAC v. HitOne K.K., 1842 HANREI JIHŌ 120, 128 (Osaka Dis. Ct., Feb. 13, 2003).
180

2011]

LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS GROUP FEATURE ARTICLE

193

b. The Osaka High Court’s decision
The Osaka High Court found that Kuromusaizu was the
principal committing infringement. 183 The court reasoned that
Kuromusaizu technically decided/controlled each user’s
reproducing act, which consisted of direct infringement by
considering that: (1) the unique system of Yoridorimidori allowed
all residents to take advantage of only one particular TV program
data; and that (2) Kuromusaizu continuously gave
maintenance/management by remote control. 184 Also, the court
held that Kuromusaizu had earned a benefit by this service. 185
F. Remaining Problems of Japanese Case Laws
The most common characteristic of these Japanese cases is that
almost all of the court decisions have applied an overall
consideration standard such as the Karaoke rule or its variation186
and have considered various factors depending on each
placeshifting service’s content, leaving large uncertainty for
deciding the legality of placeshifting technology. 187 As a result, it
However, in Yoridorimidori, the Osaka High Court as appellate court rejected to
adopt this theory and applied the variation of the Karaoke rule. Mainichi Hōsō
K.K. v. Kuromusaizu K.K., 1991 HANREI JIHO 122, 137-38 (Osaka HIGH Ct.,
June 14, 2007). Also, the Tokyo District Court in Miyuki Kitagawa v. Hiroyuki
Nishimura, 1893 HANREI JIHŌ 131 (Tokyo Dis. Ct., Mar. 11, 2004) explicitly
rejected this theory. Id. at 134-35.
183
Yoridorimidori, 1991 HANREI JIHŌ at139 [Appellate instance].
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See Sato, supra note 139, at 92.
187
See Ryūta Hirashima, Chosakuken Shingai Syutai no Hyōka wo
Meguru Giron ni Tuite – Shiteki Riyou Ryōiki no Kakudai to Sashitome Hani
Kakutei no Shiten kara- [Discussion Regarding Assessment for Principal of
Copyright Infringement –From Perspective of Expanding Area of Private
Exploitation and Determining Scope of Injunctive Relief-], in SAITŌ HIROSHI
SENSEI GOTAISYOKU KINEN RONSHŪ - GENDAI SYAKAI TO CHOSAKUKEN HŌ
[THE PRESENT SOCIETY AND COPYRIGHT LAW - ANNIVERSARY COLLECTION OF
ARTICLES FOR RETIREMENT OF PROFESSOR HIROSHI SAITŌ] 228, 245-46
(Toyohiro Nomura & Toshiaki Makino ed., 2008); Shiomi, supra note 26, at
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is impossible to distill a uniform rule as to the legality of
placeshifting services in Japan. That is the problem that Japanese
placeshifting businesses are now facing.
1. Inconsistency among the Court Decisions
In some cases, the conclusions have flipped back and forth
in the same case. For example, in Rokuraku II, while the district
court held that the provider was liable for the infringement of
“reproduction rights,” the IPHC reversed the decision and denied
liability. The Supreme Court then reversed the IPHC’s decision. In
addition, in Yoridorimidori, while the district court and the high
court reached the same conclusion of granting injunctive relief,
they were completely opposed on the issue of whether or not the
Karaoke rule should be applied.
2. Difficulty in Finding the Critical Factor
Table 2 at the end of this Article shows the central factors
considered in each case and the outcome of the decisions. It is
impossible to provide a consistent explanation for the relationships
between these factors and the outcomes of each case.
a. Relationship between the number of TV program data
recorded/transmitted at the service provider’s central place and
the number of customers who can use that data
The lower court’s decisions in Maneki TV seemed to rely on
the factor of how many customers can use particular television
program data recorded and/or transmitted by the placeshifting
device at the service provider’s central place. 188 Under this
consideration, if only one customer can use the particular
program’s data, that is, if other customers can never use that data,
198.
188

See
Maneki
TV,
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/
20081216170214.pdf, at 25-26 [Appellate instance of principal case],
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20061222154234.pdf,
at
11[Appellate
instance of preliminary injunction case].
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such placeshifting service should not constitute copyright
infringement (i.e. a “1-to-1 relationship”). Such services merely
bundle and support each customer’s legal conduct like a traditional
timeshifting device, such as a VCR or a DVR. If each customer
conducts the placeshifting individually, there is no room that such
conduct would constitute copyright infringement in Japan. 189 There
should be no reason to regard bundling each legal conduct as
illegal.
In contrast, if any customer can use the program data that is
recorded and/or transmitted by a placeshifting device at the service
provider’s central place, such a placeshifting service might
constitute copyright infringement (i.e. a “1-to-many relationship”)
because it is more akin to the video on demand service, rather than
merely bundling and supporting an individual customer’s
placeshifting conduct.
According to such considerations, it may make sense that the
courts have concluded that Yoridorimidori, with its 1-to-many
relationship, should be liable for copyright infringement. 190
However, because the courts in Rokuga Net and the Supreme Court
in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II have concluded that service
providers should be liable despite the services having a 1-to-1
relationship, these decisions seem inconsistent with that
consideration.
b. Access to the service provider’s website
One characteristic of Rokuga Net was that each customer had
to access FA Vision’s website with a password to request the
recording and transmitting of television programs. Such a
characteristic might demonstrate much of the service provider’s
ability to control/manage the particular exploitation by each user.
While still unclear, there is a possibility that this factor pushed the
189

The private use limitation might prevent infringement of the
“reproduction right.” See Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 30 (1). As
well, the “right of public transmission” and the “right of making a work
transmittable” might not be infringed because the transmission is not made to
the public. Id. art. 23(1); see supra notes 145 and 146.
190
See Tamura, supra note 54, at 65.
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courts to conclude that FA Vision is liable. 191
c. An original device vs. a commercially available device
Only in Maneki TV, the service provider did not use its original
device but rather a commercially available device (Sony’s
“Location Free”). However, the Supreme Court in Maneki TV
suggested that such a distinction has no meaning in holding the
service provider liable.
3. Recent Supreme Court’s decision in Maneki TV and Rokuraku
II
The Supreme Court recently has made disfavor of placeshifting
clear. Under its standard in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II, almost
every placeshifting service may be illegal in Japan. However, the
Supreme Court’s decisions seem to expand the copyright
protection against placeshifting too broadly and make the boundary
of copyright law ambiguous. For example, in Maneki TV, the
Supreme Court seemed to hold that an individual Base Station
constituted an “interactive transmission server” solely because its
customer might fall within the definition of public. Under the
Japanese Copyright Act, “public” refers to unspecific people or a
large number of specific persons. 192 However, because individual
Base Stations could transmit the data only to an individual
customer, it might never constitute an “interactive transmission
server.” 193
191

See Sato, supra note 139, at 106-07; Tamura, supra note 54, at 62.
The Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 3, art. 2(5) (providing, “‘the
public’ includes a large number of specific persons”).
193
See supra note 146. In this regard, the IPHC correctly understood what
the matter is. The IPHC analyzed whether the entire system of Maneki TV
including all the Base Stations at the office constituted an “interactive
transmission server” and whether an individual Base Station did or did not
(consequently, holding negative conclusions for both questions). Then, the IPHC
correctly held that an individual Base Station transmitted the data only to a
individual customer and the other customers could never access that Base
Station, and that thus an individual Base Station might not constitute an
“interactive
transmission
server.”
Maneki
TV,
192
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Also, in Rokuraku II, the Supreme Court still used the overall
consideration standard in disfavor for the placeshifting provider by
reasoning that “reproduction” must be impossible but for the
provider’s service. However, it is self-evident that the provider
causes the customer’s reproducing act in a placeshifting service. 194
Thus, the court’s reasoning seems to be insufficient to justify its
conclusion. 195
V. HOW SHOULD JAPANESE LAW TREAT PLACESHIFTING?
A. Basic Standpoint
There is large uncertainty in deciding the legality of
placeshifting services in Japan because the courts have applied an
overall consideration standard. Such uncertainty might chill the
incentive for new placeshifting providers. On the other hand, it is
not clear how placeshifting services would damage content
owners’ legitimate interests, which should be protected by
copyright law. Under such a situation, whether placeshifting is
illegal should be decided by a legislative body. 196 In a civil law
country such as Japan, it is preferable for the judicial body to be
discreet in deciding an issue that has not been scrutinized by the
legislative body. Thus, unless an explicit enactment (including
revision of the Japanese Copyright Act) is made, the court should
be reluctant to regard placeshifting as illegal by applying an overall
consideration standard. 197

http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf, at 25-27 [Appellate
instance of principal case].
194
If the provider gives no contribution and the customer must act all by
himself, it is no longer called a service.
195
Or, we might understand the Supreme Court showed its belief that any
service of automatically transmitting TV programs must be prohibited with no
exception. But, such attitude too much favors the protection of contents holders’
interest and burdens service providers who try to introduce the novel and useful
innovation.
196
See Tamura, supra note 54, at 69.
197
See id.
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B. IPHC’s Decisions Considering the Volition Factor
Two of the IPHC’s decisions, Maneki TV and Rokuraku II,
denied placeshifting providers’ liability. It should be noted that
these decisions did not apply the Karaoke rule. They demonstrate
the IPHC’s attitude of reluctance to apply the Karaoke rule too
broadly. This author agrees with this IPHC attitude because one
should not overestimate a copyright holder’s interest by too broad
an application of the Karaoke rule unless a legislative body has
first legislated whether placeshifting is illegal or not.
What theory should Japanese courts rely on to avoid holding a
placeshifting illegal until the legislative decision is made? This
Article suggests the volition requirement as one such theory.
Because, in Japan, an indirect actor’s liability depends on whether
the actor falls within the scope of the principal committing an
infringing act under Article 112 (1) of the Japanese Copyright Act,
the volition factor requiring the principal’s active exploitation of
specific copyright work might be suitable. Interestingly, as one of
the reasons for denying the placeshifting providers’ liability for
copyright infringement, the IPHC’s decisions noted the volition
element similar to Cablevision: The service provider “not only
never decided to transmit the digital data . . . but also was never
involved with such decisions made by each user. . . . Transmitting .
. . depends on a decision by each user completely” 198[in Maneki
TV] and “[t]he legal reproducing behaviors [was] conducted by the
users’ free will” 199[in Rokuraku II]. Thus, the IPHC has come to
focus on “the most direct and commonsense assessment to
understand that each user selects the TV programs which would be
recorded and transmitted on her own voluntary will and directs the
recording and the transmission, and then such acts are
automatically done . . .”200 Although these decisions were reversed
by the Supreme Court, the IPHC’s discreet attitude might be
preferable until a legislative body decides the legality of
198

Maneki TV, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20081216170214.pdf,
at 31-32 [Appellate instance of principal case] (emphasis added).
199
Rokuraku II, http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/20090224172114.pdf,
at 31-32 [Appellate instance of principal case] (emphasis added).
200
Hirashima, supra note 187, at 246 (emphasis added).
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placeshifting.
CONCLUSION
Both in the United States and Japan, there remains some
uncertainty for placeshifting service providers. In the United
States, although Cablevision provided a clear conclusion that the
placeshifting provider is not liable for direct infringement with the
volition requirement, its potential for secondary liability and
eligibility for the fair use exception still has not passed judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the volition
requirement can always work for every placeshifting situation
including the hypothetical instance that this Article discussed.
In Japan, the problem is more serious. According to the divided
court decisions, the legality of placeshifting is uncertain. IPHC’s
decisions in Maneki TV and Rokuraku II presented a slight hope
for clarification. The IPHC has become reluctant to regard
placeshifting as illegal by applying the Karaoke rule and such a
discreet attitude might be preferable until legislative action occurs.
However, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions.
Accordingly, we will have to clarify what kind of placeshifting can
be legal under the Supreme Court’s decision. This Article suggests
that the volition factor might be one tool to avoid holding a
placeshifting service illegal until the legislative decision is made.
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FIGURE ONE: CABLEVISION
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FIGURE TWO: ROKUGA NET
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FIGURE THREE: MANEKI TV
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FIGURE FOUR: ROKURAKU II
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FIGURE FIVE: YORIDORIMIDORI
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TABLE ONE: CASES IN JAPAN
Case

Court/Date

Rights at issue

First instance:
Tokyo D. Ct., Oct.
7, 2004
“Rokuga
Objection Ct.:
Reproduction
Net”
Tokyo D. Ct., May
right
Preliminary
31, 2005
Injunction
App. Ct.: INTELL.
HIGH Ct., Nov. 15,
2005
First instance:
“Maneki Tokyo D. Ct., Aug.
4, 2006
Right of making
TV”
transmittable
Preliminary App. Ct.: INTELL.
Injunction HIGH Ct., Dec. 22,
2006
First instance:
Tokyo D. Ct., June
20, 2008
1. Right of
making
“Maneki App. Ct.: INTELL.
HIGH Ct., Dec. 15,
transmittable
TV”
2. Right of public
Principal 2008
transmission
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 18,
2011
“Rokuraku
Tokyo D. Ct., Mar.
II”
Preliminary 30, 2007
Injunction
First instance:
Tokyo D. Ct., May
29, 2008
“Rokuraku App. Ct.: INTELL.
HIGH Ct., Jan. 27,
II”
Principal 2009
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 20,
2011

Reproduction
right

Reproduction
right

Outcome

Overall
Consideration
Applied

Infringement

Applied

Applied

Applied
Non
infringement
Applied

Applied
Non
infringement
N/A

Infringement

N/A

Infringement

Applied

Infringement

Applied

Non
infringement

N/A

Infringement

Applied
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First instance: Osaka
Infringement
D. Ct., Oct. 24, 2005 1. Reproduction
*
right
2. Right of
“Yoridorim App. Ct.: Osaka
making
idori” HIGH Ct., June 14,
Infringement
transmittable
Principal 2007
3. Right of public
Sup. Ct.: Jan. 20,
transmission
Infringement
2011

Applied

Applied

Applied

* The Osaka District Court in Yoridorimidori denied establishment of direct
infringement under “Karaoke” rule. However, it held that the defendant’s
service should be within the target of injunctive relief.
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TABLE TWO: CONTENTS OF SERVICES IN RELATED CASES
Contents of service
Case

Who
ManageOwner of
Device provides
ment of
device
device?
Device

“Rokuga
Original
Net”
device
[1 D / 1C]

Service
provider

Commercially
“Maneki
available
TV”
device Customer
(Sony’s
[1 D / 1C]
“Location
Free”)
“Rokuraku II”

Original
device

Service
provider

Original
device

Service
provider

[1 D / 1C]

“Yoridori
midori”
[1 D /
many Cs]

Service
provider
(contended)

Customer

Service
provider

Service
provider

Right at
issue

Outcome

ReproductInfringement
ion right
1. Right of
making
Lower Ct.:
transmittable
Non
2. Right of infringement
Sup.Ct.:
public
transInfringement
mission

Sup.&Dist.
Ct.:
Service
Service
Reproducti
provider
Infringement
provider
on right
(contended)
App. Ct.: Non
infringement
1. Reproduction
right
2. Right of
making
Service
transCustomer
Infringement
provider
mittable
3. Right of
public
transmission
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